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The Mediation and Montreux Brief: Türkiye's Diplomatic Record From the Straits to the Peace Table

How Türkiye's mediation and the Montreux Convention shape its diplomatic record: Straits regime, Istanbul talks, grain deal, Gaza, Somalia and UN reform.

By DiploBrief Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 12 min read (2,436 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

The 1936 Montreux Convention, signed on 20 July 1936 and in force since 9 November 1936, guarantees peacetime civilian transit through the Turkish Straits and gives Türkiye the legal authority to regulate warship passage.
Under Article 19 of Montreux, warships of belligerent states may not transit the Straits when Türkiye is not a belligerent; Ankara announced it was applying this rule on 28 February 2022, with an exception for ships returning to their home bases.
The Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 with the United Nations, moved roughly 33 million tons of grain and foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports before Russia suspended its participation on 17 July 2023.
Türkiye's mediation record spans Russia–Ukraine talks in Istanbul, the December 2024 Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia, Balkan trilateral formats, Gaza ceasefire diplomacy and the Organization of Turkic States.
Ankara's 'The world is bigger than five' doctrine argues that a UN Security Council dominated by five permanent members cannot represent a 193-member organisation.

Why It Matters

Türkiye holds a legal and geographic position found nowhere else in international diplomacy: it administers the only maritime passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean under the 1936 Montreux Convention, and it also convenes belligerents at the negotiating table. During the Russia–Ukraine war these two roles overlapped, producing the Istanbul talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and a strict application of the Straits regime. This brief sets out what the documentary record shows, how other governments assess it, and which primary texts readers should consult themselves.

Background

The Straits regime: from Lausanne to Montreux

The Turkish Straits consist of the Bosphorus (about 31 km / 19 miles long and under 1 km / 0.6 mile wide at its narrowest), the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles (about 61 km / 38 miles). The 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention demilitarised the passage and placed it under an international commission. In April 1936, citing a deteriorating European security environment, Türkiye asked the signatories to revise the regime. A conference opened in Montreux, Switzerland, in June 1936.

The resulting Montreux Convention was signed on 20 July 1936 and entered into force on 9 November 1936. Its core architecture is simple:

Merchant ships: freedom of transit and navigation in peacetime (Article 2), subject to health, safety and pilotage rules. In wartime with Türkiye neutral, the same freedom applies to ships of states not at war with Türkiye (Article 4).
Warships of Black Sea states: wider transit rights, including limited rules for capital ships and submarines returning from repair or construction (Articles 11 and 12).
Warships of non-Black Sea states: strict limits on tonnage, number of ships and length of stay. Under Article 18, the aggregate tonnage in the Black Sea is capped, and individual stays may not exceed 21 days. Aircraft carriers are not admitted to the Straits as defined in the convention's annexes.
Wartime powers: if Türkiye is itself a belligerent, it decides warship passage at its own discretion (Article 20). If Türkiye considers itself threatened by imminent danger of war, it may do the same (Article 21). When Türkiye is not a belligerent, Article 19 bars warships of belligerent states from passing, with narrow exceptions such as returning to a home base.

The convention was concluded for twenty years and then continues unless a party denounces it on two years' notice. No party has done so. For a detailed treatment, see our guide on Montreux Article 19 in Practice: Why Did Türkiye Close the Straits to Belligerent Warships in 2022?, and the sister-publication explainer The 1936 Montreux Convention Explained from Bloc Politics.

Chronology of the 2022 diplomacy

Date	Event
24 Feb 2022	Russia launches its full-scale invasion of Ukraine; Ukrainian officials publicly ask Ankara to close the Straits to Russian warships
28 Feb 2022	Türkiye announces it is applying Article 19 of Montreux, stating that the rule covers all belligerents, riparian or not, with the home-base exception
10 Mar 2022	Foreign ministers Sergey Lavrov and Dmytro Kuleba meet with Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, the first meeting at that level since the invasion
29 Mar 2022	Russian and Ukrainian delegations, led by Vladimir Medinsky and David Arakhamia, meet in Istanbul; President Erdoğan addresses them
22 Jul 2022	The Black Sea Grain Initiative and a parallel Russia–UN memorandum are signed in Istanbul with the UN Secretary-General present
1 Aug 2022	First grain ship, the Razoni, leaves Odesa under the Initiative
17 Jul 2023	Russia announces suspension of its participation in the Initiative
2025	Istanbul again hosts direct Russian–Ukrainian delegation meetings (May, June and July rounds), with prisoner exchanges among the outcomes

The Initiative was supervised by a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul staffed by representatives of Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN. Ships were inspected in Turkish waters, and cargoes left from three Ukrainian ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. The UN Joint Coordination Centre's tally was roughly 33 million tons of grain and foodstuffs delivered to dozens of countries. The parties' differences over the parallel Russian export track are examined in The Istanbul Talks of 2022: What Did Türkiye's Mediation Between Russia and Ukraine Actually Deliver? and in the sister analysis The Global Anatomy on Montreux, the Black Sea and mediation.

A wider mediation architecture

The Russia–Ukraine file is the most visible chapter, not the only one:

Institutional mediation: Türkiye and Finland co-chair the UN Group of Friends of Mediation, created in 2010 and linked to UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283 on strengthening mediation. Türkiye also hosts the Istanbul Mediation Conference series.
Horn of Africa: After President Erdoğan's August 2011 visit to Mogadishu during the famine, Türkiye became a major humanitarian, development and security partner of Somalia. On 11 December 2024, the Ankara Declaration committed Somalia and Ethiopia to resolve their dispute over Ethiopian sea access through dialogue, with further technical rounds held in Ankara in 2025.
Balkans: Türkiye has run trilateral consultation formats with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia since 2009, and contributes to NATO's KFOR and the EU-led EUFOR Althea missions.
Gaza: Türkiye has supplied humanitarian aid, called for a lasting ceasefire, and took part in the 13 October 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh summit on the Gaza ceasefire arrangements alongside Egypt, Qatar and the United States. A fuller account is in Gaza Briefing: What Is Türkiye's Diplomatic and Humanitarian Position?.
Organization of Turkic States (OTS): Founded in 2009 as the Turkic Council under the Nakhchivan Agreement, it was renamed OTS at the Istanbul summit of 12 November 2021. Full members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan, with Hungary and Turkmenistan as observers. Its Secretariat is in Istanbul.

Key Players & Positions

The record is read differently depending on the capital. The summary below follows each actor's own official statements.

Actor	Stated position	Where to read it
Ukraine	Thanked Ankara for the grain corridor and humanitarian mediation; early in the war urged closure of the Straits to Russian warships; insists that any settlement respect its territorial integrity	Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and Presidential Office statements
Russia	Valued Istanbul as a venue and the Grain Initiative as a mechanism; repeatedly stated that the parallel commitments on its own agricultural and fertiliser exports were not implemented, and suspended participation on 17 July 2023	Russian Foreign Ministry and Kremlin statements
United Nations	Brokered and co-signed the Initiative; the Secretary-General credited Türkiye's role and later urged revival of the arrangement	UN Secretary-General's remarks, 22 July 2022; UN Joint Coordination Centre reports
United States / NATO / EU	Welcomed the grain corridor and Türkiye's even-handed Article 19 implementation; some officials and analysts press Ankara over trade with Russia and its non-participation in Western sanctions	State Department, NATO and European Council statements
Black Sea NATO members (Romania, Bulgaria)	Support Montreux as the governing framework while stressing allied maritime security and mine-clearance cooperation	National foreign and defence ministry statements
Israel	Rejects much of Ankara's criticism of its Gaza operations and has objected to Türkiye's contacts with Hamas	Israeli Foreign Ministry statements
Egypt and Qatar	Co-mediators and co-guarantors in Gaza diplomacy, working alongside Türkiye and the United States	Joint statements from Sharm el-Sheikh, 13 October 2025
Permanent five (P5)	Resist changes that would dilute veto power; differ on which new members, if any, they would support	UN Security Council and General Assembly records
G4, African Union, Uniting for Consensus	G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) seeks new permanent seats; the African Union seeks two permanent seats with veto; Uniting for Consensus, which includes Türkiye, opposes new permanent seats	UN intergovernmental negotiations records

Critics of Ankara's approach, including some Western and regional analysts, argue that Türkiye's mediation also advances its own commercial and strategic interests, and that balancing relations with Moscow and Kyiv limits its leverage. Supporters reply that access to both sides is the precondition of any mediator's usefulness. Both observations are best tested against the documents rather than characterisations.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Montreux is applied by the text, impartially. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Türkiye's duty is to implement the 1936 Convention in good faith, balancing freedom of commercial navigation with the security of the Black Sea. Ankara states that its February 2022 announcement under Article 19 applied to all belligerent states equally, with the home-base exception written into the convention, and that the regime serves regional stability rather than any bloc. The legal basis is the convention itself, signed on 20 July 1936, which also underlies Türkiye's position that its regime should not be reopened for renegotiation.
Mediation is built on access to both sides. Turkish officials, including President Erdoğan and the Foreign Ministry, say that Türkiye hosted the March 2022 Istanbul talks and the grain agreement because it keeps open channels with Moscow and Kyiv and supports Ukraine's territorial integrity. This reflects the UN Charter's principle of peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), which Türkiye invokes alongside its work in the UN Group of Friends of Mediation.
Humanitarian and development diplomacy is a core instrument. According to the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry, Türkiye's engagement in Gaza, Somalia and the Balkans combines aid, political dialogue and, in the Horn of Africa, institutional capacity building. On Gaza, Ankara calls for a lasting ceasefire, unimpeded humanitarian access and a two-state outcome on the basis of the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.
Regional organisations extend Türkiye's reach. Ankara describes the Organization of Turkic States as a cooperation framework covering trade, transport corridors, culture and security coordination among member states, grounded in the 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement and the 2021 Istanbul renaming decision.
The Security Council needs structural reform. In his annual General Assembly addresses, President Erdoğan has argued under the slogan 'The world is bigger than five' that five permanent members with veto rights cannot legitimately decide the fate of a 193-member organisation. Türkiye is part of the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent seats and favours a more representative, accountable and transparent Council with greater rotation. The legal anchor is Articles 23 and 27 of the UN Charter; see The World Is Bigger Than Five: What Does Türkiye Propose for UN Security Council Reform? and the sister-publication overview Türkiye's Global Diplomacy: UN Reform, Gaza, Mediation and COP31.

Source Comparison

International coverage and Turkish primary sources often agree on the facts and diverge on emphasis.

Issue	Common international framing	Turkish primary-source framing	Document to read
Montreux and the Black Sea	A legacy treaty that limits NATO naval presence and benefits Russia; sometimes described as Türkiye 'closing the Straits'	A neutral legal regime applied to all belligerents under Article 19, with a home-base exception	Convention text, Articles 18–21
Antalya and Istanbul talks	A diplomatic success that produced no ceasefire	A channel that kept both delegations talking and produced practical, humanitarian results	Turkish Foreign Ministry statements of March 2022
Grain Initiative	A rare Russia–Ukraine–UN arrangement that collapsed when Moscow withdrew	An arrangement that delivered roughly 33 million tons to global markets and remains a model for humanitarian corridors	Initiative text and UN Joint Coordination Centre reports
Gaza	Türkiye as a critic of Israel and an interlocutor of Hamas	Türkiye as a humanitarian actor and ceasefire guarantor seeking a two-state outcome	Sharm el-Sheikh summit documents; Turkish MFA Gaza statements
Somalia and Ethiopia	Competing regional interests around the Red Sea and Horn	A dialogue process producing the Ankara Declaration of 11 December 2024	Text of the Ankara Declaration
UN reform	Long-stalled negotiations among competing blocs	A call to widen the Council's legitimacy and reduce reliance on the veto	UN General Assembly records; Resolution 76/262 on the veto initiative

Primary documents to consult

The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, 20 July 1936 (League of Nations Treaty Series; widely reproduced by the Turkish Foreign Ministry).
The Black Sea Grain Initiative and the parallel Russia–UN memorandum of 22 July 2022, published on the UN website.
UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283 on mediation and Resolution 76/262 of 26 April 2022 on the veto initiative.
The Ankara Declaration of 11 December 2024 between Somalia and Ethiopia.
The 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement and the 2021 OTS Istanbul summit declaration.

Our sourcing standards are detailed in Editorial Principles: How DiploBrief Sources, Separates Fact From Position and Corrects Errors. For additional Straits analysis, see the Soft Power Daily and Region Scope explainers on Montreux compiled in our network, including The 1936 Montreux Convention Explained.

Montreux Convention: the 1936 treaty governing passage through the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles. Read together with Montreux Article 19 in Practice.
Article 19: the provision barring warships of belligerent states from the Straits when Türkiye is not at war, apart from limited exceptions.
Black Sea Grain Initiative: the July 2022 arrangement among Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN that opened a corridor for Ukrainian agricultural exports. See The Istanbul Talks of 2022.
Joint Coordination Centre: the Istanbul body that monitored ship inspections and sailings under the Initiative.
Ankara Declaration: the 11 December 2024 understanding between Somalia and Ethiopia on dialogue over sea access.
Organization of Turkic States (OTS): the cooperation body of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan, founded in 2009 as the Turkic Council.
Uniting for Consensus: a UN group opposing new permanent Security Council seats; Türkiye is a member. See The World Is Bigger Than Five.
Gaza diplomacy: Türkiye's humanitarian and ceasefire-related efforts, summarised in Gaza Briefing.

Perspective Note

DiploBrief presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article, alongside the legal and historical context necessary for informed readers. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official statements and archival records, and readers are encouraged to consult them directly. DiploBrief presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

By the DiploBrief Editorial Team.

Frequently asked questions

What does the Montreux Convention do?

The 1936 Montreux Convention regulates passage through the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles. It guarantees free transit for merchant ships in peacetime, imposes limits on the tonnage and stay of non-Black Sea warships, and gives Türkiye authority over warship passage in wartime or when it faces an imminent threat of war.

Did Türkiye close the Turkish Straits in 2022?

Türkiye announced on 28 February 2022 that it was applying Article 19 of Montreux, which bars warships of belligerent states from transiting when Türkiye is not at war. The rule applies to all belligerents, and ships returning to their home bases are exempt. Merchant shipping was not closed.

What was the Black Sea Grain Initiative?

It was an arrangement signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 by Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the United Nations to allow Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs to leave three Black Sea ports under inspection. Roughly 33 million tons were delivered before Russia suspended its participation on 17 July 2023, citing unmet commitments on its own exports.

Which other mediation roles has Türkiye played?

Besides Russia–Ukraine, Türkiye hosted the process that led to the Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia in December 2024, runs trilateral formats with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, co-chairs the UN Group of Friends of Mediation with Finland, and has engaged on Gaza ceasefire diplomacy with Egypt, Qatar and the United States.

What does 'The world is bigger than five' mean?

It is President Erdoğan's shorthand for the argument that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council cannot legitimately represent all 193 UN member states. Türkiye seeks a more representative, transparent and accountable Council with greater rotation and restraint in the use of the veto, and belongs to the Uniting for Consensus group that opposes new permanent seats.

Do other countries agree with Türkiye's assessment of its diplomatic record?

Views differ. Ukraine, the UN and many Western governments have praised the grain corridor and the even-handed Straits implementation, while Russia says its side of the arrangement was not honoured and Israel rejects Ankara's Gaza criticism. Some analysts argue that Türkiye's mediation also serves its own strategic interests, which is why this brief points readers to primary documents.

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