What Is the 'Terror-Free Türkiye' Initiative? A Briefing for Diplomats

Why It Matters

The Terror-Free Türkiye initiative is the Turkish Presidency's framework for ending the PKK's armed campaign, which began in 1984, through a combination of security operations, legal measures, political dialogue and social policy under the rule of law. It matters to diplomats because its outcome affects Türkiye's internal politics, the future of armed groups in Iraq and Syria, and the wider security balance in the Middle East. This briefing sets out who is involved, what the initiative aims to achieve, a chronology based on official statements, and how it relates to the 'one state, one army' principle.

Background

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) launched its armed insurgency in Türkiye on 15 August 1984. It is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States and the European Union. Its founder, Abdullah Öcalan, has been held on İmralı Island since his capture in 1999. Four decades of violence caused heavy loss of life, displaced communities in the southeast and shaped Türkiye's security policy, including its cross-border operations. For definitions of those operations, see Operation Names Decoded: Claw, Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring and Spring Shield.

The 2025 process is not Türkiye's first attempt at a political track. A 'Resolution Process' (Çözüm Süreci) ran from roughly 2013 to 2015 and collapsed in July 2015, after which violence resumed. Ankara has since framed its approach as security-first, with Operation Claw-series campaigns in northern Iraq and operations in northern Syria. These operations rest on the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Sister publications cover this doctrine in depth: see Counter-Terrorism at the Source: UN Charter Article 51, Cross-Border Operations and Terror-Free Türkiye.

Chronology of the current process

The dates below reflect publicly reported statements and events. Readers should check the Presidency and Directorate of Communications for the latest official record.

The process is ongoing and later steps depend on verification and implementation. This page does not assert details that official sources have not confirmed.

Key Players & Positions

Who is involved

• The Presidency (Cumhurbaşkanlığı): It leads and sets the political framework. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has described the goal as a 'Terror-Free Türkiye' and a terror-free region.
• MHP and AK Party: The governing alliance. Bahçeli's October 2024 intervention was a turning point because of the MHP's long-standing hard-line stance.
• DEM Party: The pro-Kurdish party whose delegations have held contacts with Öcalan on İmralı and with state officials. It supports the process and calls for legal guarantees.
• TBMM Commission: A cross-party parliamentary body for the legal and social dimensions. Reporting indicates the İYİ Party has objected to the process and stayed away from it, and the CHP has participated with conditions and reservations.
• National Intelligence Organization (MİT): Widely reported to be part of the security and verification channel.
• The PKK leadership and Öcalan: Their public declarations in 2025 are the basis for the dissolution claim.

Other actors and official positions

• Iraq and the Kurdistan Region: Baghdad has banned the PKK, and Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government officials have publicly welcomed steps toward disarmament. Disarmament and relocation touch Iraqi sovereignty, so Baghdad's consent is essential.
• Syria's transitional government: Damascus seeks to integrate armed groups, including the SDF, into the state. Ankara has supported this path.
• The United States and the EU: Officials have broadly welcomed the PKK's announcements, while stressing sustained implementation and respect for rights. Both list the PKK as a terrorist organization.
• Domestic critics: Some opposition figures and rights organizations ask about the legal basis for any amnesty or reintegration, the role of the courts and the treatment of detained politicians. Some nationalist voices doubt the PKK's sincerity. Each of these positions should be read from the speaker's own statements.

Regional Implications

Iraq

The PKK has maintained bases in the mountains of northern Iraq, including areas near Qandil, which has been the focus of the Claw-series operations. Disarmament and withdrawal would, in Ankara's view, end the rationale for these operations. Iraq's formal ban on the PKK in 2024 and its improving ties with Türkiye, including cooperation on energy and the Development Road project, create a favorable framework. The key unknowns are verification mechanisms and the fate of fighters, which are political and legal questions for Baghdad, Erbil and Ankara.

Syria

The link to Syria is more complex. The 10 March 2025 agreement envisages SDF integration into Syrian institutions. Ankara says the principle must be 'one state, one army' with no autonomous armed formation tied to the PKK. Supporters of the SDF stress its role in the fight against DAESH (ISIS) and seek guarantees for Kurdish rights and local governance within Syria. This tension between integration terms and security guarantees is the issue most likely to determine whether the Turkish process stabilizes the region. See also the Mediation and Montreux Brief for Türkiye's wider diplomatic record.

Source Comparison

A fair reading uses both sets of sources. Turkish documents show Ankara's stated aims and legal reasoning, while international and domestic critics highlight implementation gaps. For the sourcing standards used here, see Editorial Principles. For a parallel security analysis, read Hard Power Review's What Is the Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative? Security, Law and Politics Explained.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye): The Presidency-led framework for ending PKK violence.
• PKK/KCK: The Kurdistan Workers' Party and its umbrella structure, the Kurdistan Communities Union. Listed as terrorist by Türkiye, the US and the EU.
• PYD/YPG and SDF: The Syrian group Ankara regards as the PKK's Syrian branch, and the coalition (SDF) in which it is the core. The SDF's status is disputed between Ankara and its Western partners.
• One state, one army: The principle that a single state authority and army should hold arms in Syria, and by extension that no armed group should act as an autonomous force.
• Article 51: UN Charter provision recognizing the inherent right of self-defense against armed attack.
• FETÖ: The Fetullahist Terrorist Organization, which Türkiye holds responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. It is a separate file from the PKK process.

Related reading: Mediation and Montreux Brief, Operation Names Decoded, Fact Check on PYD/YPG and the PKK, and, for the wider diplomatic context, The Political Anatomy's Türkiye as Mediator.

Perspective Note

DiploBrief presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article, alongside the legal and historical context necessary for informed readers. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official statements and archival records, and readers are encouraged to consult them directly.

By the DiploBrief Editorial Team.